

## ABSTRACTS

### Michel Bourdeau, *Comte on Psychology: The Criticism of "Inner Observation" and the Constitution of a "Systematic View of the Soul"*

Few of Comte's theses have been as poorly understood as his position on psychology. Early criticism of inner observation is often taken as the refusal of psychology in general, and he has also been criticized for not including it among the basic sciences of his classification.

To show the weakness of such an interpretation, I will proceed in two stages: I will specify who exactly was the target of the criticism of introspection; I will show that, even if Comte does not call it *psychology*, he gives great importance to the study of psychic phenomena.

In the first case, the critique of inner observation needs to be contextualized. It is then quite easy to establish that it does not claim to establish the impossibility of psychology in general but targets a particular school that dominated the French university and whose most famous representative is Victor Cousin, a spiritualist and eclectic philosopher, now quite forgotten, but who exerted a considerable influence on French philosophy in the nineteenth century. In the second case, to show that there is room for a positive psychology, I will present the "systematic view of the Soul", which it is not excessive to say commands the whole of the second philosophy of Comte, and whose construction rests on the three couples : biology and sociology, animality and humanity, anatomy and physiology.

### Denis Fisette, *The Background of Brentano's Philosophical Program and its Debt to Early Positivism*

Franz Brentano is one of the most influential figures in the philosophy of the late nineteenth century, not only in Germany but also in Austria. In Austria, Brentano and his successors developed a philosophical program which had a decisive impact on the history of Austrian philosophy. In this talk, I will focus on the origin of Brentano's program of a scientific philosophy which he developed in his *Psychology from an empirical Standpoint* published in 1874. My main objective is to show that this program was the result of Brentano's research in Würzburg (1866-1873) and that it has been largely inspired by the Auguste Comte's positive philosophy and the empirical philosophy of John Stuart Mill.

My talk is divided into 4 sections

I. I will first identify the main sources of Brentano's interests in Comte's philosophy

II. I will then carefully examines the main topics in Brentano's paper "Auguste Comte and positive philosophy"

III. I will then identify some aspects of Brentano's philosophical program in Vienna which have been influenced by Comte.

IV. I will conclude with two remarks on Brentano's lecture on positivism from 1893-1894

### Ion Tănăsescu, *Brentano's Early Writings and His Contribution to Positive Philosophy*

Although Brentano would probably disagree with the following thesis, I will maintain in my presentation that at least two of his writings represent clear contributions to the positive philosophy established through the works of A. Comte and J. St. Mill. In order to support this thesis, I will tackle the following problems: i) the theory of stages in Comte and the distinction between traditional and modern in Brentano; ii) the encyclopedic scale of the sciences in Comte and the early classification of the sciences in Brentano; iii) the concept of positive science in Comte, J. St. Mill and Brentano; iv) the conception of psychology and inner perception in Comte, J. St. Mill and Brentano.

## Emanuele Mariani, *A Brentanian Look at History. The Four Phases of Philosophy Theoretically Reconsidered*

The philosophy of history presented by Franz Brentano in the 1895 conference – “The four phases of philosophy and its current state” – looks as one of his most original theories and, simultaneously, as one of the most deeply rooted in the spirit of the time. Recent literature unanimously recognizes in this respect the debt of Brentano to Auguste Comte’s positivism *per se* and through John Stuart Mill’s mediation, in an attempt to establish the leading idea of a scientific philosophy. And it is from a historiographical perspective that the strongest objections have been formulated: Hugo Hofmann, for instance, stressed the lack of relevance of Brentano’s view in respect to the intricate relationship between sciences and philosophy in late Antiquity. As an alternative interpretation, Barry Smith and Bálasz M. Mezei proposed to consider the four phases of Brentano’s theory not as real historiographical categories, but as ideal-types, in a Weberian sense, so as to save the philosophical content of the theory at the expense of its historiographical pertinence.

We would like to develop yet another reading more into line, wherever possible, with the principles of Brentanian philosophy that was notoriously reluctant to the use of ideal entities. The alternation between ascending and declining phases might thus be interpreted as corresponding to what Brentano calls, in the wake of Aristotle, “the law of synonymy” that regulates the relationship between “proper” and “improper” presentations. The declining phases would then be the improper exemplifications of what philosophy properly is, to wit, the univocally conceived search for truth. The originality of Brentano’s approach to the history of philosophy would hence be attested from an empirical point of view, thanks to his Aristotelian legacy in the midst of Mill and Comte’s influences.

## Bianca Savu, *Reinterpreting Comte through Brentano's Notion of Decline. A Comparative Analysis*

In this talk, we propose a comparison between Comte’s view on the history and development of human knowledge (that is, philosophy) and Brentano’s. The novelty of our approach resides in the fact that the central notion of this comparison is the notion of decay, or decline, or decadence. In the literature, this is one of the main points of departure between Brentano and Comte: undeniably, the French philosopher has influenced Brentano, yet the latter brings forward a notion which seems to be neglected by Comte. While according to the Comtean theory, the development of human knowledge follows a straight, progressive pattern, the Brentanian one is non-linear, with leaps and cyclical, all due to the decline phases. This leads the discussion to the characteristics of the human spirit, for each account in part.

The strategy we will adopt for our task is to identify (i) what does “decay” mean, for Comte; (ii) its importance for the general theory on the development and history of human thought; (iii) the conditions of existence and examples. The claim we make is that, although the author is well aware of the existence of decline, the underlying metaphysical suppositions of his theory (that is, that the human spirit will advance in its quest of explaining the surrounding world) secure the entire account. Once having established what does “decay” mean, we can move forward and see whether we can discuss about a common ground with the three phases of decline from Brentano’s theory. At first sight, there seems to be no direct connection between the two approaches to decay, yet we claim that both accounts gravitate around the tendency (metaphysical, maybe) of having a fulfilling explanation of phenomena: when this tendency is neglected or not sought to be reached with proper means, decline happens.

## Guillaume Fréchette, *Philosophy as a Speculative and Exact science: Brentano's Weltanschauung*

It has been usual to associate Brentano’s philosophical program with the thesis formulated in his habilitation exam, according to which the methods of philosophy are nothing else than those of the

natural sciences (the so-called thesis 4). I will argue that thesis 4 plays a central role to understand Brentano's philosophical program, but only within the interplay of another central thesis, namely the idea that philosophy should reject the distinction between speculative and exact sciences, this rejection being its condition of existence (thesis 1).

As I will argue, these two theses, taken together, express what I would call the principle of philosophy as a science. According to this principle, philosophy must oppose the distinction between exact and speculative sciences, since this opposition is its condition of existence (thesis 1) and the methods of philosophy are none other than the methods of the natural sciences (thesis 4). The first thesis seems at first glance to be directed among other things against speculative idealistic projects like that of Schelling; but it was equally directed against a restricted understanding of the "exact" sciences as consisting only of studies involving quantitative measurements. Brentano's ideal of philosophy as a science combines the idea that there is a sense of "speculation" according to which metaphysics is a speculative, and yet exact, enterprise – even more so than "exact physics" (in a sense akin to Comte's positive method a positive speculation) – with the idea that true science must also allow for this kind of "speculative exactness," and not only for the alleged exactness required by quantitative measurements.

Given this reading of thesis 1, it is easier to understand the sense in which Brentano considers that philosophy be understood as a science, and his claim that it shares its methods with natural sciences. Like the natural sciences, philosophy uses methods such as observation, deduction, and induction, insofar as they are applicable to the objects of their investigation. However, this does not mean that all philosophical investigations should be conducted with the methods of the *natural* sciences, which would amount to naturalism. In his view, it seems that philosophy shares with mathematical sciences the same kind of exactness, and with natural sciences its reliance on empirical methods. Philosophy combining the both aspects, this is what gives it its special position in the realm of science, for, as he also stressed in the metaphysics lectures of 1867: "an *exact and speculative* science is not a contradiction". Therefore, there is a sense in which philosophical investigations can be speculative and yet exact and scientific in the true sense. The principle of Philosophy as a science therefore allows for a unitary sense of science by virtue of the identity of methods between philosophy and natural sciences (insofar as they deal with the same objects, i.e., physical phenomena), while leaving room for a kind of exactness in philosophy which makes it scientific in a broader sense than that implied by the strict commonality of methods referred to in thesis 4. In other words: Thesis 4 should not be understood as meaning that *all* methods of philosophy are the methods of natural sciences, but rather that all methods of natural sciences should be used in philosophy. Thesis 1 is so to speak a restriction of thesis 4, but on the other hand, thesis 4 also imposes a restriction on thesis 1. In the last part of the paper, I will show how this interplay between thesis 1 and thesis 4 is developed in later texts by Brentano, and I will discuss some implications of this reading.

## Wolfgang Huemer, *Brentano's Conception of Science*

In his fourth Habilitations-thesis Brentano has famously suggested that philosophy should adopt the method of the natural sciences. In order to shed a light on Brentano's conception of philosophy it is, thus, essential to understand how he conceives the continuity of method between philosophy and the natural sciences. In my paper I will focus on these questions and will discuss Brentano's relation to the positivistic and the neo-positivistic conceptions.

## Thomas Binder, *The Franz Brentano-Institute in Oxford*

It is hitherto hardly known that from 1939 until 1949 Oxford University hosted a *Franz Brentano Institute*. It was founded by Oskar Kraus (the former head of the Brentano Archive in Prague) and his pupil Georg Katkov with the strong support of Oxford's Sir David Ross and Gilbert Ryle. The talk tries to give an overview of the prehistory of the institute and of the few years of its existence. Moreover the talk will present Kraus' Gifford Lectures *New Meditations on Mind, God and His Creation* which he delivered 1941 at the University of Edinburgh, and Katkov's uncompleted work on intentionality which was intended as an introduction into Franz Brentano's philosophical

thinking for the english-speaking world. Kraus' lectures and Katkov's fragment can be considered as the last two major philosophical works of the Brentano School in the narrower sense.

## Christopher Macleod, *The Relation of Philosophy and Psychology in the Work of J.S. Mill*

Mill stands in a tradition of thinking – the school of “experience and association” as he puts it – that attempts to utilise psychological explanation in trying to address questions of philosophical interest. In this paper, I address the question of how philosophy and psychology are related in Mill's work. I begin by attempting to isolate what Mill takes as the *data* for psychological explanation – what we are inspecting when we are in the process of looking inwards *via* introspection aided by associationist theory – and how this can be useful for philosophical reflection. I suggest that, for Mill, the data elicited by psychological observation is partial and obscured in certain key respects. It is nevertheless of use in showing various philosophical positions to be untenable and narrowing the field of philosophical options. I go on to illustrate the use and limits of psychology in two key cases: the foundations of normativity, and the nature of belief and representation of the world.

Normativity of belief and action: the proof of the principle of utility, and the proof of the principle of induction, draw on psychological facts. That we *do* desire pleasure is used as evidence for the fact that pleasure is *desirable*; that we are spontaneously inclined to form inductive beliefs is used as evidence that inductively formed beliefs are *reasonable*. In spite of this, Mill holds that there is a gap between “science” and “art”. More is needed than psychology to account for the normativity.

Representation and world-directed belief: Mill attempts to offer an explanation of the nature and acquisition of various ideas by appealing to associationistic processes. Simple ideas can be combined into complex ideas of objects. Nevertheless, Mill notes that no psychological explanation can be given of how such ideas can be representation *of* the world. This gap between an image and belief, Mill notes, is itself inexplicable in terms of the association of ideas. More is needed than psychology to account for world-directed thought.

Phenomena such as normativity and world-directed thought are not fringe philosophical issues – and as such, we must acknowledge the limitations Mill clearly saw to the project of the school of “experience and association”.

## Constantin Stoenescu, *Was Brentano in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint a Silent Follower of Mill's Phenomenalism?*

My aim in this paper is to try to offer an answer to the question if we have strong reasons to interpret Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* as an attempt to apply to psychology the positivist approach outlined by Comte and developed by Mill. Although Comte has denied the possibility of inner perception as a source of psychological knowledge, Mill has taken into account the task of an empirical science of mental phenomena. At a first glance it is obvious that Brentano used Mill as a source. He refers explicitly and largely to Mill in two places in Book I, first in Chapter I, Section 2, when he debates the possibility of psychology as a science based on laws, and in Chapter IV, Section 3, when he talks about a proper method to discover these laws, the so-called inverse deductive method. But Brentano offer only a neutral comment regarding these topics, as a review, and he used these insights only as starting points in his research. My thesis is that Mill's influence on Brentano was much stronger but in an implicitly mode. Brentano has taken from Mill the framework of his analysis of psychological phenomena, from the difference between physical and psychological to the view on psychological phenomena as permanent possibilities of experience. I have identified many fragments where Brentano used a millian approach, among them in Book II, Chapter I, Section 9. Therefore, I think that my historical reconstruction reveal a historical fact which was ignored till now regarding the Mill's influence on Brentano.

## Cyril McDonnell, *Scientific and Unscientific Methods in Empirical Psychology: Brentano's Dispute and Critique of Comte, Mill and Maudsely's Accounts of Inner Perception*

It is generally accepted that Brentano's doctrine of the 'inner perception of our own psychological phenomena' is central both to his understanding of descriptive psychology as a science in general and to his discovery of the intentionality of consciousness in particular in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874). Yet despite this, and even though his doctrine of 'inner perception' has received much less attention than 'Brentano's thesis', there is little agreement about what exactly his doctrine of inner perception is. Indeed at the time of his writing of *PES* Brentano himself was well aware of the critics of 'inner perception', taking various thinkers to task in *PES*, such as Comte and Maudsley, who either denied the existence of inner perception in human consciousness or, if it did exist, rejected its scientific significance (within natural science). According to Brentano, nonetheless, other empiricists in the history of thought, such as Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Mill and Hume, deploy some version of inner perception in their psycho-analysis of the mind, notwithstanding major differences in their conceptions of the mind and of the soul and body and in their accounts of 'inner perception' itself. Brentano's relationship to such ancient Greek, Medieval and English empiricists, nevertheless, is properly critical in that, as he informs us, he has 'profited from their doctrines not only when he accepted them, but also when I [he] had to challenge them' (*PES*, p. xxviii). It is, then, precisely because Brentano wishes to argue for the value of inner perception in any 'modern conception' of psychology as an empirical science that Brentano finds it necessary to engage directly in the debate with Maudsely, Comte and others about the existence, nature, value and significance of 'inner perception'. And part of this debate, Brentano notes, requires him to rule out *misinterpretation* and *misunderstanding* of 'inner perception' as well as to provide a proper understanding and evaluation of 'inner perception' itself.

This paper examines some of the arguments that Brentano presents for and against inner perception as outlined in his *PES*. From the outset, however, it is of importance to note that Brentano's doctrine of 'inner perception' is quite intricate and much disputed. A complicating factor is also Brentano's ambiguous use of the term 'inner perception' to refer to several different things. In the first part of this paper, therefore, I will identify four different meanings of 'inner perception' that Brentano uses with a view to ascertaining which ones are in concert or in disagreement with the way 'inner perception' as he says Maudsley, Mill, Comte and others understand, define or reject it. Once these meanings are distinguished, Brentano's doctrine of 'inner perception' is not the tissue and web of confusion and contradiction as sometimes portrayed. Yet Brentano's doctrine of 'inner perception' is not without its difficulties, difficulties which may be insurmountable regarding its alleged 'scientific' status for his new science of 'descriptive psychology' and to which I will draw attention at the end of the paper in an evaluation of Brentano's doctrine of 'inner perception'.

## Andreea Eşanu, *Franz Brentano's Multifaceted View of Psychological Induction: From Bain and Mill's Empiricist Induction to Statistical Inference and Intuitive Induction*

A topic only marginally addressed by Brentano's modern scholarship (Bergmann 1944; Chisholm 1967; Tassone 2012; Seron 2017) is his view (or rather views) of induction as the proper method of psychology: the main aim of psychological induction is to set up the most general laws of psychology as an empirical science. In the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (*PES*), Brentano's view of psychological induction is empiricist (based on J. St Mill's *A System of Logic* and Alexander Bain's *Logic*): the highest laws of psychology, i.e. those of a "very comprehensive universality" are empirical generalizations derived from and verified only by experience. At the opposite end, in the *Descriptive Psychology* (*DP*) Brentano presents a different view of psychological induction: the highest laws of psychology are analytical generalizations from inner experience. This bears an important consequence upon the verification of induction: in both cases psychological laws are inductive, but instead of relying on exhaustive case-by-case verification (impossible as it

seems in psychology) or on statistical confirmation, intuitive induction rests in what Brentano calls intuition.

In the following presentation, I will briefly analyze Brentano's multifaceted view of psychological induction: (i) empiricist induction in *PES*, (ii) induction modeled by a calculus of probabilities and statistical inference in *PES* and *Versuch über die Erkenntnis* (based on Laplace's theory of probabilities), (iii) intuitive induction in *DP*. Two important conclusions will emerge from this. (1) Only induction modeled by probabilities and statistical inference is an *explicit formal* inference schema for induction. This inference schema forms the method of genetic psychology. (2) Empiricist and intuitive induction are not explicit inference schemas of induction. The later Brentano (see "Modern Errors concerning the Knowledge of the Laws of Inference", 1890) hints that empiricist induction is validated by experience while intuitive induction is validated by intuition; also, empiricist induction does not work because experience cannot form both the basis and verification of induction (the so called Hume's problem). In *DP*, while experience remains the basis, Brentano seems to argue that intuition provides the verification of induction: inner experience relays an intuition (*Einsicht*) into the abstract properties of our representations of various mental acts – e.g., when acquainted with an act of judging one immediately acknowledges that a judgment must be either positive or negative. Thus, contrary to Chisholm's (1967) interpretation of intuitive induction in *DP*, I will maintain that is not because one directly experiences green that one believes and infers that all green contains yellow in it, but one does so because experiencing green comes along with the *intuition* of the properties of that mental act's representation in one's mind. In this sense, psychological induction is grounded and verified by intuition.

### Hynek Janousek, *Brentano's Foundation of Ethics and Mill's*

The talk is going to explore the descriptive psychological foundations of Brentano's ethics especially in relation to his analysis of pleasure and pain as it is presented in *The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong* (1889), in the lectures posthumously published as *The Foundation and Construction of Ethics* (1952) and in his smaller works on psychology of sensory perception. Furthermore, Brentano's theory of preferences and its application in ethics will be taken into account in order to elucidate Brentano's view of the principle of the sum of the greatest good and his critique of Mill's qualitative utilitarianism. The following points are to be addressed: How does Brentano's descriptive psychology transform his understanding of Mill's utilitarianism? Is Brentano's ethics a branch of utilitarianism and if yes, what are its main characteristics? And how does Brentano's ethical standpoint bear on his metaphysical views?

### Carlo Ierna, *Brentano's Mathematical Foundation of Science and his Critique of Comte and Mill*

In my talk I will examine Brentano's version of empiricism and his strategic positioning with respect to Mill's British Empiricism and Comte's positivism using their views on mathematics as a foundational science as a case study. Mathematics is relevant in this context, given that for Brentano mathematics is both logically (Brentano 1874, 34) and chronologically prior (Brentano 1874, 29) to the other sciences: it is the foundation and the model. Moreover, mathematical methods find application anywhere we find magnitudes, from physics to psychology (see e.g. Brentano 1874, 86, 93). Against Mill and Comte, Brentano holds that not only mathematics, but also geometry, is analytical, deductive and a priori. While arguing against the aprioricism of Kant and German Idealism on one side, he also opposes more radical forms of empiricism. Brentano's *Psychologie nach Empirischen Standpunkte* does not give a complete enough picture of his views on the foundations of mathematics, containing merely some very general remarks about the position of mathematics in the chain of sciences, in close parallelism to Comte. Hence, my claims about the Brentanist philosophy of mathematics will be supplemented and substantiated with textual evidence from Brentano's unpublished manuscripts about *Megethologie* (the theory of magnitudes). Brentano owned the second edition of 1864 Comte's *Cours de philosophie positive*, in which he made many annotations and comments. In marginal notes, Brentano remarked explicitly on Comte's

discussion of “The position of mathematics in the system of the sciences” (“*Die Stellung der Mathematik im System der Wissenschaften*”, 85) and on the fact that according to Comte “Geometry” would actually be “a natural science” (“*Die Geometrie eine Naturwissenschaft*”, 256). Where mathematics would have “ideal universality” (“*Ideale Universalität*” 111), according to Comte geometry would be “the first part of concrete mathematics” (“*der 1ste Theil der concreten Mathematik*” 257), and hence, being applied to concrete objects, not be completely a priori anymore. For Brentano, however, “mathematics is not an inductive, but a purely deductive, and in this sense, a priori science” (Meg 40025 f.) and likewise “geometry still bears the character of a purely deductive science” (Meg 40032). Indeed, Brentano thought it would be possible to give a purely analytical proof of Euclid’s axioms (Brentano Q 8, 183-201, specifically on the eleventh axiom, 191-201). The inductive sciences would then start with mechanics, which however still depends on mathematics and geometry as foundation. Quite contrary to Mill, Brentano thinks that “it is not induction that sanctions deduction, but deduction, and specifically mathematical deduction, that sanctions all rational scientific justified induction.” (Meg 40025 f.) Brentano underscores that all kinds of inductive reasoning can in the end be reduced to an “*inductio per enumerationem simplicem*”, which Mill himself admits to be fallible (Mill 1843, Vol. II, 111). This cannot serve as a foundation for all sciences, and certainly not for mathematics. The justification of induction by induction would lead to a vicious circle (Meg 40024). Instead, the foundation of induction and the inductive natural sciences must happen on a deductive basis: the calculus of probability (Meg 40025). The kind of mathematics that is to serve as foundation for the calculus of probability must hence be completely deductive a priori.

This case study will then be the basis for an assessment of what Brentano means when he talks about the nature of the scientific method and of a scientific theory: what makes science *science* and what would make psychology and philosophy into sciences? Thanks to the analysis of Brentano’s mathematical foundations of science and the comparative analysis of his critique of Comte and Mill, we can achieve a better understanding of Brentano’s project of philosophy as science.

### Witold Płotka, *The Controversies over Descriptive Psychology in the School of Twardowski: On the Brentanian Heritage in the Early Phenomenology in Poland*

Twardowski studied in Vienna under Brentano between 1886-1889. In his *Philosophical Autobiography*, Twardowski expressed an intellectual debt to Brentano, especially to his method. In my paper I want to present Twardowski’s reading of Brentano’s descriptive psychology, and, moreover, I want to sketch main directions of how Twardowski’s ideas—mainly the project of descriptive psychology—were developed by his phenomenologically oriented students, e.g., Blaustein. To do this, I will refer to Twardowski’s work (published in 1897 in Polish) on *Psychology in the Face of Physiology and Philosophy*, and to the text on *Actions and Products* (originally published in 1912). And so, Twardowski discusses with Comte’s thesis that psychology is a part of physiology as empirical psychology. Twardowski defends introspective method (*contra* Comte) by a reference to Brentano. Twardowski takes in this text the position of psychologism. Twardowski presents a clear anti-psychologistic position in the *Actions and Products* text where he differentiates the action, and its product. Whereas psychology concerns the former, philosophy—including epistemology and logic—concerns the latter. Blaustein, who studied under both Twardowski and Husserl in Freiburg, phenomenology is a descriptive-psychological method. Descriptive psychology, as defined by Blaustein, adopts quasi-mereological vocabulary of wholes and parts to describe different types of consciousness as given in introspection. Blaustein uses this methodological approach to describe aesthetical acts, e.g., act of experiencing theater play, or experiencing listening to the radio.

### Alexandru Bejinariu, *Descriptive and Intentional Content. Considerations on Husserl’s Logical Investigations from Brentano’s empirical point of view*

My aim in the present paper is to discuss Husserl’s understanding of the concept of Brentanian empirical psychology, and the way in which some basic Brentanian distinctions suffer significant

transformations in Husserl's interpretation. Although Husserl's critical remarks toward Brentano stretch throughout *LI*, I use for my study mainly the *Introduction to LI*, the *Fifth Logical Investigation* (§§ 1–20), and the *Appendix to the LI*. In order to better circumscribe the differences between the Brentanian concept of empirical psychology and Husserl's understanding of it, I first attempt to clarify the relation between the three senses of consciousness distinguished in the *Fifth Logical Investigation* and Husserl's delimitation of the domains of psychology and phenomenology. Second, I approach Husserl's distinction between *descriptive* and *intentional content*. By doing this, I argue, we can also identify the main methodological reasons on which Husserl fails to offer an exact reconstruction of the Brentanian concept of empirical psychology. Finally, elaborating on some key insights in the recent work of Ion Tănăsescu, I show that a contributing factor to Husserl's phenomenological (mis)understanding of Brentanian empirical psychology is to be found in his lack of interest in the positivistic (of Comtian and Millian inspiration) research frame which is essential for *PES*.

### Julian Apostolescu, *Husserl's Critique of Brentanist Psychology in the Appendix to the Logical Investigations*

The purpose of my presentation is to provide an overview of Edmund Husserl's brisk critique of Brentano's psychology as presented in the highly revealing but neglected Appendix to the *Logical Investigations* entitled 'Outer and Inner Perception: Physical and Psychical Phenomena'. First, I will give a brief exposition of Brentano's criteria used in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* from 1874 to clarify the meaning of the 'physical phenomena' and 'psychical phenomena'. Second, I will examine the ways in which Husserl reacts to and corrects Brentano's criterion for the separation of the mental from the physical upon the basis of inner perception. By doing so, I will be able to present a more robust and tenable picture of Husserl's early criticism of Brentano's psychology. The goal of my approach is to show how Husserl configures and constructs his own method in the *Logical Investigations* to be free of his master's "convictions" and technical "vocabulary".

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